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COMMENTS
UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN: SUPREME COURT SANCTIONS
GOVERNMENTALLY ORCHESTRATED ABDUCTIONS AS MEANS TO
OBTAIN PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In a government of laws, existence of government will be
imperilled [sic] if it fails to observe the law scrupulous-
ly.. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to be-
come a law unto himself; it invites anarchy To declare
that in the administration of criminal law the end justifies
the means - to declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private crimi-
nal - would bring terrible retribution. Against that perni-
cious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 15, 1992, the United States Supreme Court held, 6-3,
that an extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico did
not bar the U.S. from abducting a Mexican citizen who was ac-
cused of participating in the murder of an American agent in Mex-
ico.2 It further held that the abduction did not violate international
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, L, dissenting).
2. United States v. Alvarez-Macham, ii2 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
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law and that Mexico's formal objection .to the abduction and the
violation of its territorial integrity was immaterial? Therefore, the
defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of American courts.4
This Comment discusses the decision in light of pertinent poli-
cy considerations and existing precedent. Parts II5 and I1 discuss
the background of the case and the Supreme Court opinions, re-
spectively. Part IV analyzes the Court's holding and considers the
alternative methods of analysis available to the Court, specifically
considering both domestic and international legal principles.7 Final-
ly, this Comment concludes that in its zeal to win the war against
drugs, the Court rashly chose its outcome without fully analyzing
either applicable law or the ramifications of its decision, and, in
the process, has alienated and destroyed the cooperation of several
foreign nations.
R1. BACKGROUND
A. Extradition Law Generally
Generally, extradition is a vehicle whereby nations may transfer
alleged criminals between themselves via formal arrangements, in
the case of extradition treaties, or informal ad hoc arrangements.9
Extradition serves as one of several mechanisms designed to pro-
tect the rights of the accused.'0 Alternatives to extradition, such as
exclusion, deportation and abduction, lack the procedural safeguards
which extradition, especially under a treaty, provides." However,
it is more accurate to view extradition as a matter of sovereignty
and a means of fostering healthy foreign relations rather than an
international device for the protection of human rights. This is so
because, as a contract between nations, extradition treaties exist for
the preservation of the sovereign rights of the countries and not the
3. id
4. After remand, Dr. Alvarez was acquitted by Judge Edward Rafeedie, the same
judge who originally dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Because Judge Rafeedie
ordered acquittal on all charges instead of dismissal, Dr. Alvarez cannot be prosecuted
again for the Camarena murder. Lou Cannon, U.S. Judge Acquits Mexican in DEA
Agent's "85 Killing, WASH. PosT, Dec. 15, 1992, at Al.
5. See infra notes 9-38 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 39-73 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 74-118 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 1 (1991).
10. Id at 4.
11. I&
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individual rights of their citizens. 12
Inextricably woven with extradition law are issues relating to
situations where a government operates in a manner outside the
scope of an extradition treaty. The law in the United States deals
mainly with two subissues within this topic. In two cases decided
the same day, the Supreme Court held that abduction by a private
individual does not violate the terms of an extradition treaty13 and
that a formally extradited defendant may only be tried for the
crimes for which he was extradited.14
In Ker v. Illinois, the Governor of Illinois requested the Sec-
retary of State to formally petition Peru for the extradition of Fred-
erick Ker, an American citizen residing in Peru who was suspected
of larceny and embezzlement.1 5 Pursuant to this request, the Presi-
dent of the United States issued a warrant and dispatched a private
messenger to retrieve Ker from Peruvian authorities in compliance
with the extradition treaty between the nations.' 6 However, with-
out presenting documents to Peruvian officials or demanding the
government's surrender of Ker, the messenger forcibly abducted
Ker and brought him to the United States.'7 In a unanimous opin-
ion, the Supreme Court held Ker answerable in the Illinois court
for his offense, reasoning that "Forcible abduction is no sufficient
reason why the party should not answer when brought within the
jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an
offense."' 8
On the other hand, the defendant in United States v. Rauscher
was accused of assaulting and inflicting cruel and unusual punish-
ment upon a shipmate within the maritime jurisdiction of the Unit-
ed States.19 He was extradited from Great Britain on a charge of
murder.20 Thus, the issue arose whether Rauscher could be tried
for an offense different from the one for which he was extradited.
The Supreme Court resolved that issue in favor of Rauscher, stat-
ing that the weight of authority and sound reasoning supported in-
12. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alterna-
tives to Extradition, 7 VAND. . TRANSNAT'L L. 25, 25 (1973).
13. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
14. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
15. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id at 444.
19. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 at 409 (1886).
20. Id
19931
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
terpreting the extradition treaty with Great Britain to contain an
implied limitation prohibiting prosecution of an individual for an
offense other than that for which he was extradited.21
B. United States v. Alvarez-Machain
On April 2, 1990, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican
obstetrician, was forcibly abducted at gunpoint from his office in
Guadalajara, Mexico. He was then flown, via private plane, to El
Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration ("DEA") agents for his alleged participation in the kidnap-
ping and murder of DEA special agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar
and his pilot, a Mexican citizen.'
Apparently, the DEA attempted to obtain jurisdiction over Dr.
Alvarez through informal negotiations with Mexican officials prior
to resorting to abduction of the doctor.' These informal discus-
sions commenced in December 1989, when Mexican Federal Ju-
dicial Police Comrandante Jorge Castillo del Rey contacted known
DEA informant Antonio Garate-Bustamante seeking to exchange
Dr. Alvarez for an alleged Mexican thief residing in the United
States.24 Castillo met with DEA special agents Hector Berrellez
and Bill Waters and agreed that Dr. Alvarez would be delivered to
the United States in exchange for an immigration investigation of
the alleged thief, hopefully leading to his deportation.' However,
the agreement broke down in January when Mexican officials re-
quested Dr. Alvarez's transportation expenses in advance and the
DEA declined the request.2 6 Near the end of that month, Castillo
requested a second meeting with the DEA agents.27 However,
Berrellez ultimately declined to attend in light of perceived Mexi-
can-American tensions based on a televised mini-series regarding
Camarena's murder.2"
During this time, the United States government never attempted
formal extradition proceedings. Instead, Berrellez instructed Garate
21. Id at 429-30.
22. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub







28. Id. at 602-03.
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to relate to his Mexican contacts that the DEA would pay a reward
of $50,000 plus expenses for the apprehension of Dr. Alvarez.29
Berrellez testified in the district court that he had received authori-
zation to make such an offer from officials in both Los Angeles
and Washington, D.C., including the DEA's deputy director and the
United States Attorney General's office.' Dr. Alvarez was clearly
abducted pursuant to the DEA's offer. In fact, subsequent to the
abduction, the DEA made a partial reward payment of $20,000 to
Dr. Alvarez's captors and evacuated seven of the kidnappers and
their families to the United States.3 Thus, despite the fact that the
DEA agents may not have personally participated in Dr. Alvarez's
abduction, it is undisputed that they were responsible for it.
On April 18, 1990, slightly more than two weeks after Dr.
Alvarez's abduction, the Embassy of Mexico sent a "diplomatic
note" to the United States Department of State requesting an expla-
nation regarding the extent of the American government's participa-
tion in the abduction. The Mexican Embassy also advised the Unit-
ed States government that if "it [was] proven that [the abduction
was] performed with the illegal participation of the U.S. authorities,
the binational cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking
[would] be endangered .... The Embassy sent its second dip-
lomatic note on May 16, 1990, notifying the State Department that
the Mexican government deemed Dr. Alvarez's abduction to be in
violation of the Treaty between the two nations and demanding his
repatriation. 3 Mexico also represented that Dr. Alvarez would be
prosecuted pursuant to the terms of the Treaty and punished, if
appropriate, for his alleged participation in the Camarena mur-
der.' A third diplomatic note was sent from the Embassy on July
19, 1990, which requested United States officials to arrest and ex-
tradite Berrellez and Waters to Mexico for prosecution of crimes
29. I, at 603.
30. Id
31. Id As of the district court hearing date, the DEA continued to pay expenses for
these persons in an amount equal to approximately $6,000 per week.
32. Id at 604.
33. Id See also Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
34. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992) (Stevens, I., dis-
senting). The Treaty provides that the requested nation may extradite an accused or sub-
mit the case to its own criminal justice system for prosecution. Extradition Treaty, 31
U.S.T. at 5065. In keeping with this arrangement, Mexico has already prosecuted several
individuals involved in the murder. Alvarez-Machai, 112 S. CL at 2197 n.2 (Stevens, .,
disenting).
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relating to Dr. Alvarez's abduction. 5
Following his abduction, Dr. Alvarez was indicted on kidnap-
ping, murder and conspiracy charges. He subsequently moved to
dismiss the indictment, inter alia, on the ground that the court
lacked jurisdiction over him because he was abducted in violation
of the Treaty between Mexico and the United States.3 Based on
this argument, the district court dismissed the charges against Dr.
Alvarez and ordered that he be repatriated to Mexico;37 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision.38
Im. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. The Majority Opinion
In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding
that a government-authorized forcible abduction did not afford Dr.
Alvarez a defense to the criminal jurisdiction of an American
court.39 The majority commenced its analysis by presenting analo-
gous precedent without specifically discussing its applicability to
the case at bar.' The aforementioned decisions in Ker and
Rauscher were central to the Court's analysis.
Because Dr. Alvarez contended that his prosecution, like
Rauscher's, violated the implied terms of the Treaty, while the
government argued that Rauscher stands as an exception to juris-
diction only in cases where the Treaty has been invoked, the Court
set forth a purported analysis to resolve the issue of whether the
Ker rule should be applied. The majority asserted that the primary
inquiry was whether Dr. Alvarez's abduction violated the Treaty; if
it did, the Ker rule would be applied and Dr. Alvarez would be
subject to American jurisdiction.41 As the majority noted, "The
35. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 604 (C.D Cal. 1990).
36. Id. at 601.
37. Id.
38. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 846 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'4 112 S. Ct.
2188 (1992).
39. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992).
40. Id. at 2191-93 (discussing United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), which
held that an individual brought within American jurisdiction through a formal extradition
proceeding may only be tried for the offenses for which he was extradited; Ker v. Illi-
nois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), which held abduction by a private party is no defense to
American jurisdiction; and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), which held abduction
in Illinois by Michigan law enforcement officers was not a defense to jurisdiction).
41. Id. at 2193.
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Treaty says nothing about the obligations of the United States and
Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions of people from the
territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the Treaty
if such an abduction occurs."42 Therefore, in order to determine
whether the abduction violated the Treaty in the first instance, the
majority considered its language, the history of negotiations, and
principles of international law generally.
First, Article 9 of the Treaty provides:
1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up
its own nationals, but the executive authority of the re-
quested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that
Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discre-
tion, it be deemed proper to do so.
2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of
this Article, the requested Party shall submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, pro-
vided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense.43
Dr. Alvarez proposed an interpretation of Article 9 which, in es-
sence, stated that Article 9 embodies the only means by which a
nation may prosecute a foreign national. He submitted that the
nations agreed to the following arrangement: if one country wishes
to prosecute a national of the other country, the former may re-
quest extradition; pursuant to such a request, the latter may either
extradite the individual or refer the case for prosecution within its
own judicial system." In other words, through the Treaty, each
nation preserved its right to choose whether its residents should be
tried in its own courts or those of the requesting nation.45 Dr.
Alvarez argued that the preservation of this right would be ren-
dered meaningless if each nation were free to kidnap the other's
residents.'
In response, the majority concluded that "Article 9 does not
purport to specify the only way in which one country may gain
custody of a national of the other country for the purposes of
42. Id
43. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex. 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065.
44. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. CL at 2193-94.
45. Id at 2194.
46. Id
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prosecution."47  Despite its plain conclusion, however, the
majority's underlying rationale is not at all clear. It asserted that in
the absence of extradition treaties, nations are under no obligation
to surrender their residents; therefore, extradition treaties exist "to
impose mutual obligations to surrender individuals in certain de-
fined sets of circumstances, following established procedures."48
From this, the majority then inferred that the Treaty merely estab-
lished the procedures to be followed when the Treaty is in-
voked."' Thus, since the United States chose to abduct Dr.
Alvarez, rather than invoking the Treaty, the United States was not
bound by any obligations that the Treaty set forth. In sum, our
most learned jurists asserted that it is permissible for the United
States to abduct a foreign national for purposes of prosecution
because the Treaty does not expressly prohibit abductions. Further-
more, the Justices based their conclusion that the Treaty does not
prohibit 'abductions on the fact that the Treaty does not impose
obligations on the nations unless it is actually invoked.
The circuitous logic underlying this phase of the opinion is so
flawed that intelligent response is nearly impossible; it does, how-
ever, raise some important questions. For example, if abductions
are permissible, what kind of mutual obligations have been im-
posed on the nations? What purpose do extradition treaties serve if
they do not exist to prohibit violations of territorial limits or to
establish mutual request and surrender practice and procedure?
And, why would a nation risk proceeding under the Treaty and
being denied surrender of an accused when it is free to proceed at
will so long as it never attempts formal extradition?
In addition, the rationale that underlies the majority's aforemen-
tioned conclusion - that extradition treaties exist only to impose
mutual obligations which would otherwise be lacking - seems to
be a rationale which Dr. Alvarez or the dissent would be more
comfortable asserting. The existence of mutual obligations and
specific formal procedures seems to lead to a conclusion contrary
to that of the majority, i.e., that the Treaty exists to impose ob-
47. Id.
48. Id
49. In response to a similar argument attempting to harmonize the holdings of Ker and
Rauscher, Clare Lewis stated, "This distinction is not capable of rational justification and
smacks of sophistry." Clare E. Lewis, Unlawful Arrest: A Bar to the Jurisdiction of the
Court, or Male Captus, Bene Detentus? Sidney Jaffe; A Case in Point, 28 CRIM. L.Q.
341, 348 (1985). That comment is equally applicable here.
632 [Vol. 43:627
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ligations and standards of conduct for the nations in all situations
rather than only upon invocation of the Treaty.
After discussing the specific language of Article 9 of the Trea-
ty, the majority examined the history of negotiations and practice
under the Treaty and concluded that it too failed to demonstrate
that abductions are prohibited under the Treaty.-° Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that Mexico was made aware of the Ker
doctrine in 1906 when a similar incident involving a Mexican
national took place.5 Furthermore, he reasoned that since scholars
had propounded language in model legislation in the 1930's which
would have prohibited abductions, Mexico was put on notice that
such language would be necessary to achieve such a result.5 2
Finally, the majority examined international law to determine
whether, regardless of its conclusion regarding the explicit terms of
the Treaty, a prohibition relating to abduction should be implied
according to general international legal principles.53 Dr. Alvarez
contended that the Treaty must be interpreted in light of general
principles of international law and "that international abductions are
'so clearly prohibited in international law' that there was no reason
to include such a clause in the Treaty itself."5' However, he con-
ceded that the violated nation's protest was vital to this analysis
because sources of international law, such as the United Nations
Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States,
are not self-executing, and an individual's right under the Treaty is
derivative of the nation's right.55 In other words, since nations are
free to voluntarily surrender individuals in the absence of the invo-
50. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194.
51. Id.
52. Id It is questionable whether this Court would have found even the language in
the scholarly draft sufficient to prohibit abductions. The draft stated:
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or
punish any person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject
to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or
international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or
States whose rights have been violated by such measures.
Advisory Committee of the Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdic-
tion with Respect to Crime Article 16 in Harvard Research in International Law, 29 AM.
L INT'L L 442 (Supp. 1935). Because the majority did not think that the United States,
actions with respect to Dr. Alvarez violated international law, one wonders whether this
language would have been sufficient to protect him and similarly situated individuals, as
the majority asserted.
53. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195-96.
54. Id at 2195 (citation omitted).
55. Id
1993]
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cation of a Treaty, "formal protest... ensures that the 'offended'
nation actually objects to the abduction and has not in some way
voluntarily rendered the individual for prosecution."'
The majority rejected this argument based in part on Dr.
Alvarez's reliance on Mexico's protest. It stated:
The Extradition Treaty has the force of law, and if...
it is self-executing, it would appear that a court must en-
force it on behalf of an individual regardless of the offen-
siveness of the practice of one nation to the other na-
tion ....
More fundamentally, the difficulty with the support [Dr.
Alvarez] garners from international law is that none of it
relates to the practice of nations in relation to extradition
treaties .... In the instant case, [Dr. Alvarez] would
imply terms in the extradition treaty from the practice of
nations with regards to international law more generally.
[Dr. Alvarez] would have us find that the Treaty acts as a'
prohibition against a violation of the general principle of
international law that one government may not "exercise its
police power in the territory of another state." There are
many actions which could be taken by a nation that would
violate this principle, including waging war, but it cannot
seriously be contended that an invasion of the United
States by Mexico would violate the terms of the extradition
treaty between the two nations.
With that, the third consideration of the purported analysis, the
Court once again reached a conclusion favoring the application of
the Ker doctrine, without fully analyzing the rationale or precedent
underlying its conclusion. For example, the majority failed to ad-
dress precisely why it rejected as inconsistent Dr. Alvarez's con-
tention that, in light of Mexico's formal protest, his abduction
violated the Treaty. On the contrary, several international scholars
indicate that any rights under extradition treaties belong to the con-
tracting nation and not the offended individual; therefore, Mexico's
objection was quite relevant. Furthermore, the majority failed to
explain why general international law principles, albeit not specific
to extradition treaties, should not apply to international
56. Id.
57. Id at 2195-96.
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kidnappings. Instead, the majority just glibly concluded,
[Dr. Alvarez] ... may be correct that [his] abduction was
"shocking," and that it may be in violation of general
international law principles .... [However, [Dr.
Alvarez's] abduction was not in violation of the Extradition
Treaty .... 58
To those who respect well-reasoned legal analyses, baseless conclu-
sions such as this are disappointing at best.
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Whereas the majority presented an outcome determinative opin-
ion in an attempt to blindly adhere to distinguishable precedent, the
dissent, on the other hand, offered a sensible and logical analysis
in regard to resolution of whether Dr. Alvarez's abduction violated
international law. The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice
Stevens, initially stated that it was' "difficult to see how an inter-
pretation that encourages unilateral action could foster cooperation
and mutual assistance - the stated goals of the Treaty.'"59 This
statement is indicative of the tone of the entire opinion.
Focusing on the underlying policy rationales for prohibiting
abduction of foreign nationals and responding to the majority's
"mutual obligations" argument, the dissent stated:
Extradition treaties prevent international conflict by
providing agreed-upon standards so that the parties may
cooperate and avoid retaliatory invasions of territorial sov-
ereignty .... [Extradition] treaties further the purpose of
international law, which is "designed to protect the sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of states, and to restrict
impermissible state conduct."
The object of reducing conflict by promoting coopera-
tion explains why extradition treaties do not prohibit infor-
mal consensual delivery of fugitives, but why they do
prohibit state-sponsored abductions.'
It further noted, highlighting the illogic of the majority's position:
It is true, as the Court notes, that there is no express
promise by either party to refrain from forcible abductions
58. 1& at 2196-97 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 2198 n.4 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
60. Id. (citations omitted).
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in the territory of the other Nation. Relying on that omis-
sion, the Court, in effect, concludes that the Treaty merely
creates an optional method of obtaining jurisdiction over
alleged offenders, and that the parties silently reserved the
right to resort to self help whenever they deem force more
expeditious than legal process. If the United States, for
example, thought it more expedient to torture or simply to
execute a person rather than to attempt extradition, these
options would be equally available because they, too, were
not explicitly prohibited by the Treaty. That, however, is a
highly improbable interpretation of a consensual agreement,
which on its face appears to have been intended to set
forth comprehensive and exclusive rules concerning the
subject of extradition.6
Obviously, the scenario depicted by the dissent was an exercise in
extremism, however, it effectively demonstrated the absurdity of
the majority's analysis.
In addition, as the dissent noted, the majority's method of
analysis - relying on the omission of a prohibition against abduc-
tions - was specifically rejected by the Court in Rauscher, a case
upon which the majority relied. 2 Although the Treaty at issue in
that case did not explicitly limit the jurisdiction of the acquiring
nation after extradition, the Court held that Rauscher could not be
tried for a different offense.63 The dissent in the case at bar there-
fore concluded that the "Treaty, as understood in the context of
cases that have addressed similar issues, suffices to protect the
defendant from prosecution despite the absence of any express
language in the Treaty itself purporting to limit this Nation's power
to prosecute . . . ." The dissent further noted that although the
holding in Rauscher was supported by precedent, the weightier
support was derived from "the consensus of international opinion
that condemns one Nation's violation of the territorial integrity of a
friendly neighbor."6' Finally, Justice Stevens concluded:
In the Rauscher case, the legal background that supported
the decision to imply a covenant not to prosecute for an
61. Id at 2199.
62. Id at 2199 n.10.
63. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
64. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. CL at 2201 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
65. Id
636 [Vol. 43:627
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offense different from that for which extradition had been
granted was far less clear than the rule against invading the
territorial integrity of a treaty partner that supports
Mexico's position in this case. If Rauscher was correctly
decided - and I am convinced that it was - its rationale
clearly dictates a comparable result in this case.'
Citing a case which condemned the United States for seizing a
foreign ship in a foreign port, the dissent commented that it "is
shocking that a party to an extradition treaty might believe that it
has secretly, reserved the right to make seizures of citizens in the
other party's territory."67 In Justice Story's own words, in regard
to the captured ship, to seize vessels for revenue collection purpos-
es beyond the jurisdiction of American ports or the open seas over
which all nations exercise common sovereignty "would [be] a
usurpation of exclusive sovereignty on the ocean, and an exercise
of an universal right of search, a right which has never yet been
acknowledged by other nations, and would be resisted by none
with more pertinacity that by the American." 68 From this state-
ment, made over a century and a half ago, flows the same idea of
reciprocity of which the dissent speaks. The United States should
not be permitted to kidnap a foreign national if it is not willing to
extend the same right to other nations. And, it is probably safe to
assume that the government, and the American people, would not
tolerate such outrage.
Justice Story's opinion in The Apollon also signifies how deep-
ly rooted international law is on this point. Specifically, the dissent
in the case at bar cites several sources in addition to The Apollon
to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the prohibition against violating
another nation's sovereign rights. For example, one leading treatise
states:
A State must not perform acts of sovereignty in the territo-
ry of another State.
It is... a breach of International Law for a State to send
its agents to the territory of another State to apprehend
persons accused of having committed a crime. Apart from
66. Id. at 2202-03.
67. Id. at 2201 (citing The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362 (1824)).
68. The Apollon, 9 Wheat. at 371-72.
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other satisfaction, the first duty of the offending State is to
hand over the person in question to the State in whose
territory he was apprehended.69
Thus, international law is well-settled that abduction of foreign
nationals is prohibited.
Moreover, as the dissent noted, permitting state sanctioned
abductions would render the Treaty meaningless, or in the words of
Justice Stevens, would "transform [it] into little more than ver-
biage."'0 For example, the dissent noted that several provisions
would be purposeless if the requesting country could bypass all
procedure and merely kidnap the individual and that, moreover,
such provisions only make sense within a context of mutual com-
pliance and reciprocal obligations.7
Finally, the dissent noted that even absent the aforementioned
rationales for not divesting American courts of jurisdiction over Dr.
Alvarez, the majority failed to distinguish Ker and thus, a "critical
flaw pervade[d] the Court's entire opinion." 2 The dissent com-
mented that the majority "fail[ed] to differentiate between the con-
duct of private citizens, which does not violate any treaty obliga-
tion, and conduct expressly authorized by the Executive Branch of
the Government, which unquestionably constitutes a flagrant viola-
tion of international law, and . . . also constitutes a breach of our
treaty obligations."73 The dissent then criticized the majority's
characterization of the issue to be decided, claiming that its fram-
ing of the issue was the issue decided in Ker but was not the issue
69. 1 OPPENHEIM's INTERNATIONAL LAw 295 n.1 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955), as
cited in Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2202 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also RE-
STATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432, Comment C, as cited in Alvarez-Macha, 112
S. Ct. at 2202 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If the unauthorized action includes abduction of
a person, the state from which the person was abducted may demand return of the per-
son, and international law requires that he be returned"); Louis Henkin, A Decent Respect
to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 231 (1992), as cited in 112
S. Ct. at 2202 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("When done without consent of the foreign gov-
ernment, abducting a person from a foreign country is a gross violation of international
law and gross disrespect for a norm high in the opinion of mankind. It is blatant viola-
tion of the territorial integrity of another state; it eviscerates . . . extradition ... .
70. Alvarez-Machai, 112 S. Ct. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (citing provisions requiring sufficient evidence to grant extradition; for withhold-
ing extradition for political or military offenses, where the person has already been tried,
or when the statute of limitations has elapsed; and granting discretion to refuse extradition
of an individual facing the death penalty).
72. AL at 2203.
73. d.
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that the Court had before it in the case at bar.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court had several other means of analysis available to it,
most of which compel the conclusion that the courts should not
retain jurisdiction of Dr. Alvarez. As demonstrated by Ker, both
American and other courts have been reluctant, even loathe, to
accept a concept of jurisdiction-divesting. 4 However, all the pre-
74. The Ker doctrine is this country's formulation of the Roman maxim "male captus,
bene detentus," or, "an illegal apprehension will not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction."
H. Moss Crystle, Comment, When Rights Fall in a Forest... The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
and American Judicial Countenance of Extraterritorial Abduction and Torture, 9 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 387, 387 (1991). On the other hand, at least one scholar has argued that this
maxim is superseded by two higher Roman maxims, "nunquam decurritur ad
extraordinarium sed ubi deficit ordinarium" ("never resort to the extraordinary until the.
ordinary fails") and "ex Injuria ius non oritur" ("no right can arise from a violation of
the law"). Id. at 387 n.3 (citing Bassiouni, supra note 12, at 45).
For other American sources rejecting the jurisdiction divesting concept, see Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Matta-Ballesteros ex
rel. Stolar v. Henman, 896 P.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d
896 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
ez reL Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975). But as is evident from these sources, the bar against divestiture is not absolute.
See Charles D. Siegel, Individual Rights Under Self-Executing Extradition Treaties - Dr.
Alvarez-Machain's Case, Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 765, 766 (stating that while
many cases have held that "informal" means of removing suspects from other nations did
not violate the applicable extradition treaties, the courts' rationale has "focused on the fact
that the asylum state either affirmatively assisted in the removal ...or acquiesced in the
removal by falling to protest"). Obviously, Mexico's protest is what distinguishes Dr.
Alvarez's case from all the others.
For foreign support of a nondivestiture concept, see GILBERT, supra note 9, at 185-
94. The most notorious case involving international abduction was that of Adolf
Eichmann. Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (1961). Eichmann was a German Nazi official
who was a principal character in the extermination of millions of European Jews during
World War H. M ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPAEDIA 812 (1977). He was abduc-
ted from Argentina and taken to Israel in a clear violation of Argentina's territorial sover-
eignty. Unlike Alvarez-Machain, there was a dispute over Israel's participation in the
abduction. According to one legal scholar, if Israeli agents did participate in the kidnap-
ping, its "liability" could be settled by surrendering the kidnappers to Argentina for trial
or by financial compensation to Argentina. GILBERT, supra note 9, at 184-85. Absent
Argentina's willingness to accept such settlement terms, Gilbert asserts that Argentina
could also have demanded the repatriation of Eichmann to preserve the "sanctity of the
extradition process." it at 185. If, as Gilbert contends, international law requires return of
the abducted party upon demand by the offended nation, then the United States' refusal to
surrender Dr. Alvarez upon Mexico's request constituted a violation of international law.
It should be noted, however, that in his war crimes trial it was held that Eichmann
had no standing to individually assert his rights under the treaty. Eichmann alleged that
the trial court had no jurisdiction because Israel had violated the fundamental rights of
Argentina by his abduction. Id. However, the Court held that Eichmann had no standing
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vious cases have seemed to indicate a willingness to divest juris-
diction under some circumstances.'
A. Domestic Law
1. The Violation of Law Exception
a. The Extradition Treaty
Even the Supreme Court in its opinion acknowledged that a
violation of the Treaty between Mexico and the United States
would divest the courts of its jurisdiction over Dr. Alvarez. The
exception to jurisdiction when there has been a violation of an ex-
tradition treaty has its roots in Rauscher, discussed earlier in this
Comment.76 It is based on Article IV of the United States Consti-
tution which states, "all Treaties made under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... .7' In
actuality, only self-executing treaties, or treaties which do not re-
quire implementing legislation, are binding federal laws which must
be enforced unless superseded by other federal law.7" The district
court held, and the Supreme Court did not refute, that
"[e]xtradition treaties by their nature are deemed self-executing"
and, as such, are to be accorded supreme status.79 Therefore, an
to raise this argument and, according to Anglo-American precedent, the manner in which
the individual came before the Court was irrelevant. Of course, this merely demonstrates
the international significance of Mexico's objection in Alvarez-Machain.
while acknowledging the existence of authority which rejects divestiture of jurisdic-
tion, several theorists are clearly dismayed by its perseverance. For example, Gilbert
states, "The result, that, regardless of the method by which the fugitive is brought before
the court, his trial will be valid, seems prejudicial to good international relations and
world public order." Iel See also Crystle, supra at 388 (the "doctrine has outlived its use
and only serves to encourage circumvention of the very laws courts are bound to up-
hold").
75. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) ("absent protest
or objection by the offended sovereign, Reed has no standing to raise violation of interna-
tional law as an issue"); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 873 (5th Cir. 1979) (stat-
ing, in response to the defense's argument that court had no jurisdiction due to violation
of the Convention on High Seas and the Convention on the Territorial and Contiguous
Zone, "defendant may not ordinarily assert the illegality of his obtention to defeat the
court's jurisdiction over him ...where the illegality results from a breach of internation-
al law not codified in a treaty.")
76. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
77. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
78. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILDP R. TR.IBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 149-51 (1991).
79. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 607 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub
non?. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), revd, 112 S. CL
2188 (1992) (citing M. CHERF BAssIoUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, UNiTED STATES
LAW AND PRACrICE 189 n.1 (2d rev. ed. 1987)). But see Siegel, supra note 76, at 773
[Vol. 43:627
UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
abduction in violation of an extradition treaty would divest the
courts of jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the Court determined, whether
or not correctly, that Dr. Alvarez's abduction did not violate the
terms of the applicable treaty.
b. The Constitution
Whether international kidnapping by government agents to
obtain jurisdiction violates the Constitution of the United States
raises two distinct issues. First, one must determine whether the
Constitution protected the rights of Dr. Alvarez, a noncitizen. Sec-
ond, one must determine whether abduction is actually a violation
of due process.
The Constitution can be interpreted from two different view-
points. A contractual view posits that the Constitution is a contract
between the United States government and its citizenry, or "a com-
pact between the people of the United States and its government,
creating enforceable rights and duties running between each of the
parties."80 Under this view the protections accorded to "We, the
people" in the Constitution and the corresponding limitations on
governmental action do not extend to non-citizens, and thus would
not afford protection to Dr. Alvarez.
On the other hand, an "organic" view of the document inter-
prets the Constitution, having created the three branches of gov-
ernment, as existing to limit the branches' operations within gener-
ally constitutionally accepted limits.81 Under this view, govern-
ment actors are bound by the Constitution and its limits whenever
the act within the scope of their governmental employment -
whether within or beyond the bounds of the United States.82 "In
contrast to the contractarian view, which protects only Americans,
and foreigners located within the territorial jurisdiction of the Unit-
ed States, the organic view 'potentially entitles anyone injured by
United States officials - American or alien - to Constitutional
redress."' 83 However, while there is some Supreme Court support
for the organic interpretation of the Constitution,84 the Court re-
(questioning the Court's conclusion).
80. Crystle, supra note 76, at 395 (citing R. LI.LIcH ED., FOURTH SOKOL COLLOQIUM,
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING UNITED STATES LAW IN THE
WORLD COMMUNITY 43 (1981)).
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id (citing Note, The Extraterritorial Applicability of the Fourth Amendment, 102
HARV. L REV. 1672, 1675 (1989)).
84. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. i, 5 (1956) ("we reject the idea that when the Unit-
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cently held in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez'5 that evidence
seized pursuant to an illegal search may be admitted if obtained
abroad, signifying the Court's adherence to the contractual view.
Thus, without an organic vision of the Constitution, Dr. Alvarez
and similarly situated individuals have no standing to assert due
process violations committed during their apprehension.
Even assuming that a noncitizen had standing to assert a due
process challenge to the jurisdiction of an American court, he or
she would still have to demonstrate that abduction is a due process
violation. The Ker doctrine established that forcible abduction of
aliens abroad does not violate due process." In dismissing Ker's
constitutional argument, the Court held that Ker's due process
guarantees were fulfilled by the adequacy of the trial proceed-
ings.8 7 However, in United States v. Toscanino,88 the court "as-
serted that due process extended to the pretrial conduct of law en-
forcement authorities [and] suggested that the principles underlying
exclusionary rule cases 9  . . - deterrence of official misconduct
and preservation of judicial integrity - should apply not only to
evidence, but also to persons." 90 As discussed below, however,
Toscanino was an extreme case and neither its rule nor its rationale
has been applied since. In short, the Ker reasoning still applies.
Clearly, the Supreme Court has determined that a jurisdiction-di-
vesting exclusionary rule and the application of due process
protections in the pre-trial context "conflicts with a societal need to
convict the guilty."9'
ed States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights").
85. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
86. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
87. Id. at 440 ("The 'due process of law' here guaranteed is complied with when the
party is regularly indicted by a proper grand jury ... ,has a trial according to the
forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and when, in that trial and proceedings, he is
deprived of no rights to which he is lawfully entitled.").
88. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). See also infra notes 99-105 and accompanying texL
89. The exclusionary rule was created in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
as a remedy to Fourth Amendment violations. It prohibits the introduction of evidence
gathered as a result of an illegal search and in connection therewith.
90. Jonathan Gentin, Comment, Government-Sponsored Abduction of Foreign Criminals
Abroad: Reflections on United States v. Caro-Quintero and the Inadequacy of the Ker-
Frisbie Doctrine, 40 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1238 (1991) (citations omitted) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
91. Id at 1243.
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c. International Law Generally
Unlike a defendant who is abducted in contravention of an
extradition treaty or the Constitution, current authority, although not
popular opinion, indicates that an accused who is apprehended in
breach of international law may still be tried.92 International law
is a somewhat amorphous body of law made by the nations as a
community. However, it is perfectly clear and has been the consis-
tent position of this Comment that extraterritorial governmentally-
sanctioned abductions violate customary international law.93 For
example, one author has stated, "In any case of abduction, there is
a violation of personal liberty, of the right to be detained under
legal authority, of the right of emigration, of the right to remain in
a state until expelled, and of the right to seek asylum."94 In the
case of international abduction, not only have the aforementioned
rights of the individual been injured, but the territorial sovereignty
of the nation from which the individual was kidnapped have also
been violated. However:
[t]he fact that a country violates customary international
law by abducting a person from another country does not
assist the captive once she is within the jurisdiction of the
abducting country. With limited exceptions, . . . customary
international law historically focused on governing states'
actions among themselves and did not concentrate on regu-
lating their behavior toward individuals within their juris-
diction. Customary international law has rarely been
thought to give individuals private rights of action.95
The rationale underlying this argument is that international law
exists to govern by and between the states and this cannot be
invoked to remedy transgressions against individuals.' Therefore,
it can be easily be argued that, with an objection from the offend-
ed nation, a violation of international law should serve to except
jurisdiction of an abducted individual. The point being that, as the
92. GILBERT, supra note 9, at 194.
93. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text for the dissent's discussion of gener-
al principles of international law.
94. John Quigley, Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger to Human Rights from
Kidnapping of Suspected Terrorists, 10 HUM. RTs. Q. 193, 205 (1988), as cited in
Crystle, supra note 76, at 403.
95. Siegel, supra note 76, at 780.
96. IR
6431993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
nation's territorial sovereignty was violated, it has the right to
demand reparation for any harm that flowed from that violation. In
this case, the reparation would be repatriation of the abducted
individual.
2. Outrageous Governmental Conduct: The Toscanino Exception
Under the current status of the law, the only occasion upon
which an individual has standing to challenge jurisdiction to a
criminal prosecution where his or her presence has been obtained
by abduction is where "outrageous governmental conduct" has
occurred.9 Although many readers may find abduction in and of
itself to be an "outrageous" way for a government to conduct it-
self, the parameters of this exception are considerably more narrow.
"Mere governmental kidnapping, without allegations of torture, [is]
not considered shocking to the conscience;"98 therefore, it is not
an exception to jurisdiction.
The exception was defined in United States v. Toscanino.9
And, unfortunately, its protection has not been afforded to a de-
fendant since."° Toscanino, an Italian citizen, was kidnapped
from his home in Uruguay and tortured for seventeen days in
Brazil before being brought to the United States, where he was
charged with conspiracy to import narcotics. °1 He alleged that,
with the orchestration and cooperation of the United States govern-
ment, he was bound and blindfolded, denied food, water and com-
munication, tortured, beaten and interrogated."1 When he would
not answer, "his fingers were pinched with metal pliers; alcohol
was flushed into his eyes and nose and other fluids ... were
forced up his anal passage .... Agents of the United States gov-
ernment attached electrodes to his earlobes, toes and genitals. Jar-
ring jolts of electricity were shot throughout his body .... 10
In the case at bar, the district court rejected Dr. Alvarez's
claim of torture and therefore, he was not afforded the protection
of the rule set forth in Toscanino. Despite the district court's dis-
belief at the doctor's allegations, the Supreme Court missed its
97. Crystle, supra note 76, at 393.
98. Id. at 394.
99. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
100. Crystle, supra note 76, at 394.
101. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 268-69.
102. Id at 270.
103. Id.
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opportunity to expand the exception to include conduct which
society finds, or should find, unacceptable and "shocking" regard-
less of the extent of extreme physical abuse.
3. Distinguishing Ker v. Illinois
First, despite any holding to contrary, there is no doubt that
abduction is illegal. 1°4 Thus, by concluding that Dr. Alvarez's ab-
duction did not violate the terms of the Treaty, the high Court
sanctioned illegality. This violates the rule set forth in Ker as well
as public policy. Despite any dicta indicating a contrary position,
the rule that Ker established can be characterized as follows: when
an alleged criminal is found within the jurisdiction of the States
that wished to try him, then he is liable to answer for such crime
"unless there was some positive provision of the Constitution or of
the laws of this country violated in bringing him into court. ""
As noted above, the doctor's abduction should have been held to
violate the Treaty, a "law of this country" and, at the very least
was violative of international law. Thus, by the very language of
Ker itself, its rule should not have been applied. Moreover, Ker
can be distinguished on several other grounds.
The majority purported to establish a two phase analysis, first
determining whether the abduction violated the Treaty and then
applying the rule of Ker. In reality, this purported two step process
was combined into single analysis and will be treated thus for the
remainder of this Comment. The majority treated Ker as setting
forth a blanket rule stating simply that the fact of abduction, with-
out regard for whom the abductor was, does not divest the United
States of jurisdiction of an alleged criminal. However, as all good
law students know, a legal rule is only as good as the facts under-
lying it. Therefore, the rule which Ker actually set forth was that
the mere fact of abduction by a private citizen did not divest
American courts of jurisdiction of an American citizen who alleg-
edly committed a crime within the United States. In the case at
bar, however, the United States government orchestrated the abduc-
tion, the accused was a foreign citizen and the alleged crime was
104. See M. CHERF BAssIouN, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 123 (1974); GILBERT, supra, note 9, at 8 ('the manifest illegality of abduction")
and 189 ('Abduction is so obviously illegal"); I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADTON IN INTERNA-
iIONAL LAW 72 (1971) ("Abduction is such a manifestly extra-legal act, and in practice
so hazardous and uncertain, that it is unworthy of consideration as an alternative method
to extradition in securing custody of the offender").
105. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886) (emphasis added).
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committed on foreign soil. Thus, a foreign country, Mexico, in this
case, also had jurisdiction over the matter.
Furthermore, in Ker, the government made a good faith effort
to comply with the terms of the Treaty. It was not responsible for
the acts of a private messenger acting outside the scope of his
agency arrangement. Criminal jurisdiction cannot be divested be-
cause of a tort committed by a civilian acting without government
authority. On the other hand, when the government participates in,
even organizes, the abduction of a foreign national, the policy un-
derlying divestiture of jurisdiction is quite different.
Moreover, in the case of Ker, Peru did not object to his abduc-
tion and therefore, the issue was whether Ker, as an individual, had
a positive right as a third party beneficiary to the contract between
the nations. The Ker Court held that an individual may not invoke
a treaty to preclude jurisdiction when jurisdiction was not obtained
under the treaty in the first instance. The Court stated that "[t]he
right of the government of Peru to give a party in Ker's condition
an asylum in that country is quite a different thing from the right
in him to demand and insist upon such asylum."' ° 6 This language
suggests that Peru had the right to object to the Court's jurisdiction
and that such an objection would require the return of Ker to
Peru. °' Unlike Peru, however, Mexico did object to Dr.
Alvarez's abduction and the jurisdiction of the American courts.
Therefore Dr. Alvarez did not need to rely on any affirmative
rights he alone might have under the Treaty. This distinction be-
tween the cases is material and was not adequately addressed by
the majority.
Despite the abundance of distinguishing facts, the majority
failed to explain why it so readily applied the "rule" in Ker with-
out consideration. The dissent speculated, and this author agrees,
that the pressure of presenting a tough-on-crime stance strongly
influenced the outcome of the Court's decision and led to cutting
corners in its legal analysis. The dissent stated, "there is reason to
believe that [Dr. Alvarez] participated in an especially brutal mur-
der of an American law enforcement agent. That fact, if true, may
explain the Executive's intense interest in punishing [Dr. Alvarez]
in our courts."'"~ However, as the dissent also correctly noted,
106. Id at 445.
107. Crystle, supra note 76, at 392.
108. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2205 (1992) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
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that underlying motivation
provides .no justification for disregarding the Rule of Law
that thee] Court has a duty to uphold. That the Executive
may wish to reinterpret the Treaty to allow for an action
that the Treaty in no way authorizes should not influence
th[e] Court's interpretation. Indeed, the desire for revenge
exerts 'a kind of hydraulic pressure... before which even
well settled principles of law will bend," but it is precisely
at such moments that [the Court] should remember and be
guided by [its] duty "to render judgment evenly and dispas-
sionately according to law, as each is given understanding
to ascertain and apply it."" °
4. Judicial Supervisory Power
In addition to the aforementioned avenues of analysis the Court
had before it, it also could have chosen to exercise its judicial
supervisory power to declare the government's actions illegal.1"
This power permits the judiciary to monitor and prohibit illegal
conduct by the executive and legislative branches of
government."' The doctrine exists to provide a remedy for the
violation of established rights and to preserve judicial integrity by
ensuring procedural fairness as well as deterring illegal con-
duct.112 Certainly, in the case at bar, preservation of judicial in-
tegrity and deterrence of clearly illegal conduct would have been
served by an exercise of this power. However, the Court did not
even entertain this alternative as it found nothing wrong with the
government's conduct. In fact, fifteen years ago, Judge Oakes
warned that repeated use by the government of abduction as a
means of obtaining jurisdiction in the "war against drugs" would
109. At (citations omitted).
110. While this option was rejected by the district and circuit courts, it may have been
so simply because it was unnecessary as those courts had already ruled in the doctor's
favor.
111. Crystle, supra note 76, at 405. Technically, the supervisory power of the Supreme
Court is characterized as its supervision over the federal courts in the administration of
criminal justice. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). It manifests itself in
the establishment of standards and procedures in criminal cases. Id at 340-41. In this
case, the supervisory power could have been utilized by providing a rule of decision to
the federal courts that they should not retain jurisdiction over individuals obtained by
abduction.
112. Crystle, supra note 76, at 405.
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be "inviting" exercise of the supervisory power "in the interests of
the greater good and of preserving respect for the law."" 3
C. International Policy
Extradition treaties exist to foster relations between nations and
provide a systematic procedure for the surrender and transportation
of fugitives. By sanctioning the circumvention of extradition trea-
ties through extralegal means, the Court affected international sta-
bility and subverted international process and procedure. 14 By
entering into a treaty arrangement, both Mexico and the United
States gained the ability to obtain alleged criminals who are found
in the other nation at the limited discretion of the surrendering
government 1 In exchange, both nations agreed to abide by cer-
tain formal procedures. 6 In the absence of the Treaty, the na-
tions would be forced to rely on the unbridled discretion of the
other nation in withholding fugitives. 7 They would also be sub-
ject to constant covert actions such as the one at issue in the case
at hand. However, in gaining a systematic and predictable means of
extradition and freedom from the recurring territorial violations of
113. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68,73 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring) ("[W]e may
wish to bar jurisdiction in an abduction case as a matter not of constitutional law but in
the exercise of our supervisory power under McNabb v. United States".) cert. denie4 432
U.S. 847 (1975).
114. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 106, at 123.
From a foreign policy standpoint, the assertion that extradition treaties exist for the
purpose of enhancing international relations and avoiding conflict has been supported by
negative inference by the fallout from the Court's decision. In a "firestorm of diplomatic
criticism," several foreign governments have expressed outrage at the United States' belief
that it may unilaterally choose to violate a nation's sovereign borders and abduct one of
that nation's citizens. Among these: 1) the foreign minister of Mexico dubbed the ruling
invalid and stated that Mexico considers abduction a criminal act; 2) the Canadian Min-
ister of External Affairs reported to the Canadian parliament that abduction by the United
States of a Canadian citizen would be deemed a criminal act; 3) the Colombian govern-
ment called the decision a threat to the legal stability of treaties; 4) the lower house of
Uruguay's parliament adopted a resolution stating that the ruling demonstrated "a lack of
understanding of the most elemental norms of international law, and in particular an abso-
lute perversion of the function of extradition treaties"; 5) the Minister of Security and
Justice of Jamaica denounced the holding as "an atrocity that would disturb the world";
6) The presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay issued a
joint declaration asking for a review of the decision by the Inter-American Judicial Com-
mittee of the Organization of American States. David 0. Stewart, The Price of Vengeance
- U.S. Feels Heat for Ruling that Permits Government Kidnapping, 78 A.B.A. J. 50, 50
(Nov. 1992).
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the other nation searching for suspects, it should be held that m
exchange the nations gave rights to the each other's nationals. As
one practitioner observed, "If by giving up [a certain measure
of its] freedom of action, the United States gave certain rights to
Mexican nationals, it seems a relatively small price to pay for the
ability to extradite fugitives in a systematic way "118
V CONCLUSION
In critiquing the district court decision in this case, one com-
mentator, predicting the bleak outlook for an affirmation of the
lower court decision, stated that application of an analysis which
would preclude Dr. Alvarez and other similarly situated individuals
from asserting due process claims and foreclose the possibility of a
"supervisory role for the judiciary in the extra-national
'apprehension' of criminal suspects would effectively unfetter
the power of the executive to conduct a world-wide war on drugs,
or any other subjective threat to national security, without respect
for sovereign powers, international agreements, or objective con-
stitutional standards of governmental conduct."" 9 He further pre-
dicted that "[a] vast and dark 'forest' would be created, completely
insulated from the constitutional standards which normally constrain
American state action." 120
Now that the Court has in fact created this "forest", individuals
world-wide must live in fear of American vigilantism, without
being afforded the protection of either the laws of their own na-
tions or the laws of the United States. Moreover, American citizens
must be concerned about whether courts are liable to extend the
rationales regarding the acceptance of the violation of basic human
rights to domestic criminal cases. They should also ask themselves
whether foreign countries might follow this nation's lead and fail
to follow formal extradition procedures when dealing with the
possible prosecution of American citizens. Finally, in its zeal to
"win" the war against drugs, this Court has potentially destroyed
any international cooperation between the United States and South
American nations in waging that fight, creating an atmosphere of
antagomsm and hostility by signalling to others that the U.S. gov-
ernment will do as it pleases without regard for the law or contrac-,
118. Id
119. Crystle, supra note 76, at 407.
120. Id.
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tual arrangements. Thus, with its poorly reasoned and not wholly
supported opinion, the Supreme Court has -turned upside down
years of growing international cooperation in an increasingly world
community.
HALLE FINE TERMON
